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Inforum models have been built and used in a number of countries including the USA, Russia, 
Germany, Poland, Latvia, Austria, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom1, South Africa, Mexico, 
Colombia, China, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam and perhaps others. They make extensive use
of econometrics and input-output analysis to describe the functioning of an economy not only at a 
macroeconomic level but also at the level of individual products and industries. I want to record – 
somewhat autobiographically-- the beginnings of these models, outline their evolution, defend them 
and other econometric models against the sweeping Lucas critique, and mention some of the fads in 
economics and modeling which have been avoided for good reason. 
Origin of the Inforum Models
The first of this family of models was the one built for my Ph.D. thesis at Harvard in 1961. My 
motivations for building it reached back into my childhood in the Great Depression. I was born near 
the bottom of the Depression; among my earliest memories are those of young men coming to our 
house and asking to be allowed to do a day's work for a day's food. I remember watching freight trains
go by on winter days with men in box cars huddled over kerosene heaters. I asked my father why they 
did not ride the passenger trains. “They have no money,” he replied. “They had hoped to find work 
here, but the didn't, so they will go on to Decatur (the next town) and look there.” These memories 
left the deep impression that the economy could go seriously wrong. Then came World War II. 
Everyone was employed, even many women who had not previously wanted jobs outside the home.
World War I ended in 1918; the Great Crash and beginning of the Depression came in 1929, 
eleven years later. Eleven years after the end of World War II was 1956, and I was graduating from 
college. I had earnestly wanted to understand how the same economy that had produced the postwar 
booms could also produce the Great Depression. I wanted to know how another crash could be 
prevented, so I had studied especially economics and mathematics.2 Math was important because I was
convinced that a satisfactory understanding had to be quantitative and not just qualitative. In my 
college years, I had read Keynes in the original and in various digested forms. I had read carefully 
Wassily Leontief's Structure of the American Economy, and I felt, correctly I think, that I understood 
as much as my teachers did, and that wasn't much. Still hoping to find answers, I went on to graduate 
study at Harvard. Surely, I thought, if anyone understood it would be the professors there. I studied 
with Gottfried Habeler, author of Prosperity and Depression, and James Dusenberry, who was at that 
time writing Business Cycles for the Economic Handbooks series. With Dusenberry, I read John 
Hicks's, The Trade Cycle and the business cycle chapters of R.G.D. Allen's Mathematical Economics 
(not to be confused with his Mathematics for Economists). With Robert Dorfman, I read Paul 
Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis. With Robert Mosteller, I had a comprehensive course
* This paper was originally presented to a conference organized by the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the 
Russian Academy of Science in honor of the 80th birthday of Yuri V. Yaremenko, the director of the Institute from 
1987 to his death in 1996. It has appeared in Russian in the Institute's journal Проблемы Прогнозирования 2016 Nr.
2 and in English in Studies on Russian Economic Development, 27(2), 119-126.
1 The reference here is to the U.K. model built by Robert Shackleton at the University of Maryland. The models built
by Cambridge Econometrics in England, though not built with Inform software, are closely kin in spirit and 
method.
2 In addition to French and German, I had also studied Russian, largely because I wanted something remote and 
exotic to escape the somewhat humdrum world of my other studies. I never thought I might ever actually go to 
Russia! 
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in mathematical statistics. It was a great year, but now I was sure that no one understood at the level I 
felt necessary how the economy worked.
The summer after that first year at Harvard, I worked in the capital budgeting office of 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation. There I could see all of economic forecasting services to which 
the company subscribed, and I think that was nearly all there were. There were as yet no regularly 
functioning econometric models, and the forecasts being offered were hunches based on ideas about 
cycles. They were pretty gloomy. The director of the office felt we should cut back our investments 
because we were surely going into a recession if not another depression. It occurred to me that if his 
views were widely shared, we could forecast ourselves into a depression. 
Through this experience, the importance of forecasting for the functioning of the economy was 
impressed on me. Depressions and recessions had invariably been preceded by booms fueled by 
unreasonable expectations. It would be as important to moderate the booms as to lift sights in a 
recession. These ideas were quite close to those motivating the indicative planning then evolving in 
France.  
To be safe from being drafted into the Army, I had been in the Reserve Officer Training Corps 
during college, and in the fall of 1957, I began my required two years of active duty. The Army knew 
that I knew some Russian, so after basic officer school I was detailed to the Central Intelligence 
Agency where I worked on piecing together a quantitative picture of the USSR Economy. For the first 
time since the 1920's, the USSR had just begun publishing some statistics, and all of our useful 
sources were open publications. There were, of course, many secret statistics which were not 
published in the carefully censored statistical handbooks. But Khruschev knew the secret numbers and
was fond of enlivening his long speeches with secret tidbits. The speeches were published verbatim, 
apparently without censorship, so they had to be read, and I spent many an hour scanning them. I was 
much more interested in what was happening with central planning, but the limitations and censorship 
under which the Soviet economists worked made reading their articles depressing. I had no interest in 
continuing in Sovietology; I wanted to study the economy I was part of, an economy whose 
functioning I could hope to improve. 
Back at Harvard in the fall of 1959, two important things happened for me. The first was that I 
was finally able to take a course in econometrics. Harvard offered no course in the subject. I had to 
catch the subway down to MIT, where a course was being offered by Edwin Kuh. There were all of 
four students in the course, two MIT graduate students, one undergraduate and me. Ed worked very 
hard on creating an interesting course, and through it I became acquainted with the work on 
construction of econometric models which Lawrence Klein was starting at the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
The second, and even more important thing that happened was that I got a job as a computer 
programmer for Wassily Leontief. It was on-the-job training, as I tackled programming the Univac I 
in machine language. Leontief himself knew nothing of computer programming, but he had a very 
able assistant who was my guide. Leontief was seeking a way of getting sensible results from his 
dynamic model. This model can be written as
(1) x (t)= Ax (t) + f (t) + B ẋ (t )  
where x(t) is the vector of outputs at time t, A is the input-output matrix, f(t) is the vector of final 
demands excluding expansion investment, ẋ (t) is the derivative of output with respect to time, and B 
is a matrix of incremental capital/output ratios for various types of capital goods. The growth path for 
the economy should satisfy, at least approximately, such an equation. A mathematician looking at the 
formula would say, “Yes, a system of linear ordinary differential equations. Easy. Solve for ẋ (t)
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given x(t) and use any of a number of numerical methods or calculate the characteristic roots and 
vectors of B−1( I − A) , λ1, λ2, … λn and V1, V2, … Vn, write the general solution as 
x (t) = c1 V 1e
λ1 t+ c2V 2e
λ2 t+...+ cn V ne
λn t + p(t )
where p(t) is some particular solution, and then determine the c's to fit the initial conditions.” Leontief 
was thinking of this equation in this mathematical way, and getting nowhere. In the first place, the B 
matrix had some all-zero rows, so it was singular, so B−1  did not exist. We aggregated the matrices
until B was non-singular. But the lambdas were large and complex, so the solutions were explosive – 
all except the particular solution, p(t). 
It finally occurred to me to pay attention to p(t). I knew that if f(t) was a polynomial of degree m, 
there would be a particular solution as a polynomial of the same degree. So, start with the simplest 
case where f(t) is linear: f (t) = a0 + a1 t where a0  and a1 are constant vectors. Then there
must be a particular solution of the form p(t) = b0 + b1 t . Substituting into (1) and equating the
coefficients of equal powers of t to solve for the b's and then substituting into the formula for p(t) 
gives, 
(2) p(t) = (I − A)−1(a0 + B( I − A)
−1a1) + ( I − A )
−1a1 t .
This formula made perfect sense economically! The first term is the outputs required, directly and
indirectly to produce the final demands in the base year, including the investment needed for the 
straight-line growth of final demands. The second term provides the outputs required, directly and 
indirectly for the growth in final demand since the base year. There is no B−1 involved; all the 
calculations are easily made. The solution could be easily generalized to higher degree polynomials 
and exponential terms in the final demands. In doing so, the particular solution continued to make 
sense and be easily computed. 
There was just one problem: it might not go through the initial values of x(t). It was clear that 
adding in terms from the general solution to (1) was not the way to go. I had finally realized that using 
(1) to determine ẋ (t) made no sense at all economically. There is no way and no reason that 
managers in various industries could or should set the rates of growth of their output so that the 
investment they generate would exactly use up whatever differences there might be between current 
levels of output and those generated by the first two terms of the right side of (1). Yet that is exactly 
what is required for (1) to be used to determine ẋ (t) . I thought of some devices to adjust for 
differences between observed initial values of x and those of the particular solution. On the page 
where I described them in my Ph.D. dissertation, Leontief wrote, “You have cut the Gordian knot, not
untied it.” I, on the other hand, think that by realizing that (1) could not be used to determine ẋ (t)  
the knot was untied. 
This sort of solution to (1) was used in an article in the Review of Economics and Statistics. An 
improved solution method using moving polynomial interpolation to approximate the evolution of 
outputs in a way which could be differentiated and the Neuman expansion3 of the operator
(I − ( A+BD ))−1 – where D is the differentiation operator – was used in an Econometria article 
and was the basis of the calculations in the book The American Economy to 1975, which was 
published in 1966. In the model for the book, econometrically estimated consumption functions 
played an important role. Their primary driver was disposable income. Technically, it was an 
exogenous variable, but in fact it was adjusted so that, given exogenous government and export 
3 The Neuman expansion of ( I − A )−1 is I+ A+ A2+A3+... . That this sort of expansion of the
(I − ( A+BD ))−1 operator would give the same result as my equating of like powers of t was pointed out to
me, rather reproachfully, by Robert Dorfman. He implied, correctly, that I should have seen it for myself.
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demands, the model would generate high and stable rates of employment relative to an exogenously 
forecasted labor force. Thus, disposable income became, in effect, a policy variable. Otto Eckstein 
referred to that as an “oddity” of the model. To me, it was not odd at all but a shortcut. A fully 
developed model would generate personal income and use exogenous tax rates as the policy variable to
achieve the desired level of employment. That would be better, but the lack of that mechanism did not
invalidate the forecasts as a vision of the future consistent with (a) their being believed and used by 
those making capital investment decisions and (b) tax policy being adapted to yield full employment. 
I came to the University of Maryland in the fall of 1966 and immediately set to work to build a 
new model with an important difference: an investment function for each industry would be 
econometrically estimated, based on replacement and past values of increases in output. This decision
was based on two factors: (1) the need to have a good forecasting performance in the early years of 
the forecast, and (2) the studies of my wife, Shirley M. Almon, on investment decisions. She found 
these decisions to be based almost entirely on replacement and past growth in output. Future growth, 
even if made available with perfect foresight to her regression equations, had no predictive power. 
Apparently American firms like to operate with excess capacity; only when output rises up too close to
– but still below – capacity do they invest. There are exceptions to this view, but not many.
Another early development of crucial importance was the interest taken in the work by Leonard 
Silk, an editor of Business Week. Indeed, it is from a telephone call from him in early January of 1967 
that I date the beginning of Inforum. He then organized the initial business support for our work. This 
form of support has had the great advantage over government grant support that our forecasts are 
looked at carefully by users. On the other hand, the fact that some companies paid for the forecast 
limited our ability to publish them as broadly as I would have liked. 
Initially, all of our support came from private companies using the forecasts for their long-range 
planning. Gradually, government agencies began to use our services. Sadly, most of the private 
companies dropped out saying that our service was fine but that they were no longer engaged in long-
term strategic planning. Management was instead concerned rather with short-term results which 
affected the stock price. Thus the financial supporters of our work have come to be primarily 
government agencies. They want access to the model to run alternative scenarios more than they care 
about the basic forecasts. Maybe we could now release them freely without disturbing the supporters. 
Some of the further developments at Maryland included:
(a) The creation and use of product-to-product input-output tables made by the method published
years later in Economic Systems Research.
(b) Three Ph.D. theses over a thirty-year period exploiting the household data in the Survey of 
Consumer Expenditures for forecasting personal consumption expenditures by product. Mostly these 
theses were looking for help in predicting the pattern of expenditures as income increased. The last 
also looked for predictable effects of age cohort. For example, Do the differences between the 
expenditure patterns of today's 20-30 year-olds from those of 20-30 year-olds 20 years ago tell us 
anything about how the expenditure patterns of 40-50 year olds 20 years from now will differ from 
those who are today in that age bracket?
(c) Several theses on investment. The last of them, by Daniel Wilson, used firm-level data to try 
to determine to what extent technological improvement was embodied in fixed investment.
(d) Development of a complete national income accounting part of the model so that it could be 
run either as a business cycle model with given tax rates or, as before, with a tax rate designed to give 
a specified level of employment. Whereas earlier models had concentrated on producing a full-
employment vision of the future, models with this new feature – which we called the National Income 
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Accountant, or just the Accountant – should be able to show what would happen if tax policy was not 
correctly set. They could be used as multisectoral business cycle models, just as most macroeconomic 
econometric models were business cycle models. 
(e) Development of software to make construction of Inforum models as easy as possible. One 
part of this software is the G7 regression package which includes, besides many standard techniques, 
estimation with soft constraints to allow the user to tell the program what values of parameters make 
sense economically. Macro econometric models are easily built with G7. It will also do basic matrix 
computations and display matrices. Another part is the Interdyme system which enables the model 
builder to use matrix notation to write some equations of the model, while standard C++ is used for 
parts not easily written with matrices. Programs for display of model results are also part of the 
collection of programs. 
(f) The development and application of the Perhaps Adequate Demand System (PADS) for 
consumer expenditures. The name was a reaction against the so-called Almost Ideal Demand System, 
which in my view might better have called the Absolutely Unusable Demand System because, in it, if 
the demand for one product rises faster than income, then the demand for some other product must 
turn negative with a sufficient rise in income. That other product is usually food, and the rise in 
income necessary to turn it negative may be fairly small, like 30 to 50 percent. Such demand functions
in a model aimed at forecasting in a 10 to 20 year horizon would make for utterly implausible results. 
PADS preserves the two empirically useful results of the theory of the consumer, namely, (1) 
increasing all prices and income in the same proportion has no effect on demand, and (2) income-
compensated cross price partial derivatives are equal. The second result is not necessarily preserved as
we go from the demands of a single consumer to market demand functions, but assuming that it is 
preserved cuts down by a factor of 2 the number of parameters we have to estimate. Estimating PADS
requires non-linear least squares. Symcon, a program for estimating PADS, has been developed and is 
part of the standard Inforum set of programs. 
(g) The ability to optimize the forecast of the model with respect to policy variables, such as the 
personal income tax rate, was added to the software and applied to a model of Thailand by Somprawin
Manpraesert.
 (h) The development of a Bilateral Trade Model (BTM) for linking models of a number of 
countries. As a number of countries began to develop Inforum-type models, it became increasingly 
important to link them to together. The first linking was done by Douglas Nyhus in his Ph.D. thesis. 
Some years later, it was thoroughly updated and extended by Qiang Ma. Current updating and 
extension is being conducted by Leonardo Ghezzi and Rossella Bardazzi in Florence. 
(i) Solution of a perennial problem for forecasting in industry detail when there is a long lag in 
appearance of detailed data. In December of 2015, we will produce forecasts of industry outputs for 
2016 and later years. Our industrial clients already know their output for 2015, but we will not get the 
data on 2015 from our Census sources for another year and a half or more. If it looks like we don't 
know what happened in 2015, how can we expect anyone to have any confidence in what we say about
2016 and later years? Largely through the Ph.D thesis of San Sampattavanija we now have a 
systematic way of dealing with this problem. Basically, the annual industry-level data is regressed on 
high-frequency data that is available with a short lag, such as industrial production indexes. These may,
in turn, be regressed on variables forecasted in our quarterly econometric model. Thus, we can have in
December of 2015 a good idea not only of detailed product outputs in 2015 but also of what they will 
be in 2016.  
This list includes only work done at the University of Maryland, and only some of that. There is 
much other work around the world, but I am not capable of giving a proper summary of it. All of this 
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work was done with the serious purpose of improving the forecasting or simulation ability of the 
model. None of it was done to be fashionable or to use some sophisticated technique.4
Meanwhile, however, the whole econometric modeling approach came in for heavy – but greatly 
exaggerated – criticism, and new approaches to modeling became popular among academic 
economists. Here we need to look quickly at the criticism and explain why we have been uninterested 
in following several types of modeling which have become fashionable in the academic world. 
The Lucas Critique
In 1976 Robert Lucas published in a rather obscure place an article5 that put an end to almost all 
academic modeling in the econometric tradition.6 It was entitled "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A 
Critique" and announced on the first page that econometric models could not in principle be used for 
policy analysis, though they might be quite useful for forecasting. The Inforum models were not the 
direct object of the Lucas criticism but they were close enough to the traditional econometric models 
that, if the criticism was valid, Inforum models would be in trouble for policy analysis though not for 
forecasting.
Anyone who took the Lucas critique seriously – and that seems to have been almost all of the 
academic economic profession – must not have read beyond the first page, for the rest of the article 
shows nothing in principle. Rather it examines three specific models applied to three specific policy 
questions and finds the specific theory used in the models inappropriate. 
The first model was used to study the effects of a temporary personal income tax cut. The model 
used adaptive expectations of income whereas Lucas – being from the University of Chicago – 
asserted that permanent income was what mattered. Since permanent income was hardly affected at all
by the temporary tax cut, Lucas knew without any formal model that consumption would not be 
affected. Curiously, he pointed out that the model was correctable, that is, it could have used 
permanent income. But if it were correctable, then it was not in principle impossible to use an 
econometric model to study this question. The future, incidentally, was not kind to the permanent 
income theory. The Reagan tax cuts of the early 1980s put it to the test. As soon as Reagan's proposal 
was announced, it was certain that taxes would be cut in three future steps, so permanent income rose 
immediately. Consumption did not. Consumers waited until the money was in their pockets. 
The second model examined by Lucas studied the effect on investment of a temporary investment
tax credit, but the formula used was for a permanent investment tax credit. Lucas observed, correctly I
think, that the short-term response to a temporary credit would be much larger, because firms would 
try to cram into the period when the credit was in effect investment they would otherwise have 
undertaken over the next several years. Lucas was correct and perceptive, but the problem had nothing
to do with econometric part of the model. It was an error in what was essentially an exogenous 
4 While Inforum modeling was taken up at a number of universities abroad, it did not spread in the USA academic 
world. That was not surprising, because it requires a large investment in human capital and constant updating of 
data but does not offer much opportunity for academic publishing. Not having close competitors was nice for the 
commercial side of our work, but not becoming “mainstream” also meant that there were no new Ph.D.'s coming 
from other schools with the ability to build and improve Inforum models. Since the Maryland Economics 
Department did not hire any of its own graduates, when I retired there was no one to continue teaching Inforum 
modeling in the graduate program at Maryland or anywhere else in the USA.
5  Lucas, Robert (1976). "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique". In Brunner, K.; Meltzer, A. The Phillips Curve
and Labor Markets. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 1. New York: American Elsevier. 
pp. 19–46. 
6 Ray Fair at Yale and the Inforum group at Maryland were the main holdouts.
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variable. The fact that errors in exogenous variables could cause errors in the forecast was neither new 
nor unknown nor particularly disturbing.
The third model was used to study inflation, but used a Phillips curve without acceleration, that is,
without a shifting of the curve in response to current rates of inflation. Today it would be hard to find 
an econometric model that does not include acceleration. Lucas's criticism of that particular model 
was justified, and it was a good example of what he wanted to claim was generally true, namely that 
the parameters of the model were dependent on policies followed. But the fact that the model was so 
easily modified to eliminate that dependence left Lucas without a single valid example of his point. 
Thus, he by no means showed that econometric models could not, in principle, be used for policy 
analysis.
Indeed, the Phillips curve example invites a counter-Lucas generalization: any parameter which 
depends upon a policy can be replaced by a variable which is a function of that policy. That is exactly 
what modern econometric models do with the Phillips curve. A model in which there are no policy-
dependent parameters can be said to have a policy-invariant structure. Building such models by 
conventional econometric methods need not be especially difficult; it just requires a little thought.
Interestingly, it was not the models' econometric part proper – the estimation of parameters by 
some sort of least squares – which Lucas criticized. It was the economic theory built into the models. 
He could have made a different and universally valid criticism: no study of past data alone is going to 
tell us – without some theory – how the economy will react if pushed into territory unlike any it has 
been in before. In such a case, we must rely upon theory, not the past alone. And the model's validity 
will depend upon that theory.  
Of course, there is a positive lesson to be learned from the Lucas critique: think carefully about 
the equations, especially those most relevant to the policy you intend to study. 
But did Lucas establish that econometric models cannot in principle be used for policy analysis? 
Not in the least. Instead, the critique seems to have been politically motivated. Later work was to show
that Lucas, typical of the Chicago school, was skeptical of any sort of active fiscal policy. The first 
step was to show that econometric models could not be used to design such policy. In fact, the effort 
failed, but much of the economics profession seems to have thought it succeeded. 
The Trailer Input-Output Model
Sometimes builders of elaborate but aggregate econometric models have added industry 
information to them by attaching an input-output model as sort of a trailer pulled by the aggregate 
model. The aggregate model provides column totals for the final demands of the input-output model, 
which is then solved for product or industry outputs. If these calculations are done with constant input-
output coefficient matrices over a historical period, the calculated product outputs will often steadily 
diverge from the historical outputs, so the builders of the trailer model add what they call rowscalars 
to correct for the systematic divergence. The rowscalars are projected into the future and used to scale 
each row of the input-output coefficient matrix and the corresponding row of the final demand share 
matrices. In this way, one can get product projections which are mostly not unreasonable. BUT, after 
applying the rowscalars to the final demand share matrices, the columns no longer necessarily add to 
1.0, so the sum of all the final demands may not be equal to the GDP of the aggregate model. 
This problem can, of course, be fixed by re-scaling the columns of the final demand share 
matrices, but then the rowscalars may be messed up. 
A more fundamental criticism of the Trailer approach is that it fails to use information it 
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generates. If a model generates outputs by industry, those outputs should be used to generate 
investment and employment by industry. A Trailer model ignores the information is supposedly 
generates. When a leading commercial forecasting company introduced its trailer model it described 
the model as state-of-the-art. In fact, it could hardly have been more primitive. If you want product 
outputs, get them the right way; build an Inforum model which uses the product outputs to calculate 
investment and employment by each industry. 
The Computable General Equilibrium Fashion 
I should preface my remarks on Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models by admitting 
that 
I never built a CGE,
I never hope to build one;
But this I'll say, 'tween you and me,
I'd sooner build than b'lieve one. 
Perhaps I should simply pass over CGE's in silence, but their proponents have been proud and 
loud, and rather look down on the lowly and modest builders of Inforum type models. So let me try to 
justify the last line of the above parody of the Purple Cow.
There is potentially a great deal of variety in CGE models. Possibly Inforum models are a special,
very atypical kind of CGE. Almost anything specific that one says about them invites the retort, “not 
necessarily.” But in practice most of those I have read about are pretty simple, static affairs, with 
parameters taken “from the literature” – that is, taken out of the context in which they were estimated.
The econometrics tends to be very casual; and the estimates, second hand. The models referred to one 
period only. 
A CGE is usually built in the framework of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) which combines 
make and use input-output tables with various other elements of national accounts. The identities of 
the national accounts are expressed through the rule that the sum of any row is equal to the sum of the
corresponding column. This way of writing the identities means that the SAMs are usually very large, 
contain mainly 0 elements, are hard to read but are, of course, mathematically correct. There is 
presumed to be a representative consumer who has specified demand functions – often of the AIDS 
type – and each industry has a production function with substitution between capital and labor. A total
labor supply is specified. The way of handling the input-output make and use tables make the models 
use the industry-technology assumption rather than the more plausible product-technology 
assumption.
The “general equilibrium” term is justified by the solution method. For any specified vector of 
prices and wages, the consumer demands can be computed and the output that each industry is willing 
to supply can be calculated. A very ingenious algorithm devised by Herbert Scarf and implemented in 
the GAMS program and other software with which CGE's are usually built is used to find the 
equilibrium prices, outputs, and consumer purchases. The sum of employment in all industries equals 
the labor force or some specified fraction of it defined as “full employment.” It is all just like 
economics textbooks and theory courses say the economy works – though they leave out the Scarf 
algorithm. Moreover, with GAMS, it is all pretty easy once the SAM is in place. The production 
functions are usually Cobb-Douglas, so they can be estimated with data from one year. (In the Cobb-
Douglas function, Q = ALα K 1−α  where Q is output, L is labor input, and K is capital input. 
Assuming perfect competition, it is easily shown that α is labor's share of the product, so no 
econometrics is necessary to estimate it.) The model is then calibrated, that is, its parameters are set
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so that the data for one year is fit by the model. There is seldom if ever any testing of the model to 
see if it fits other years. 
In short, the usual CGE is a pretty casual affair, a SAM and some parameter estimates taken 
from here and there. The glory of the CGE is the Scarf algorithm. But how necessary is it in reality?
In the typical CGE, given a set of prices, there will be a unique output which each industry is willing 
to produce and a unique amount consumers want to buy of each product. And if the prices change, the
amounts the firms are willing to produce change. This is the world where the Scarf algorithm thrives.
But it is a world very different from the one I live in. I am typing on a computer for which I paid 
$400. If I ask the maker how many he would make at $400 each, he will say, “How many do you 
want?” In other words, his supply curve is horizontal. That puts us back into the world of Inforum 
models where the producer sets the price and the consumers decide how much to buy. All the fancy 
market-clearing price calculation is irrelevant. What matters are the consumption functions, the 
investment functions, the import functions, and so on. In the typical CGE, they were probably made 
up pretty informally, whereas in the typical Inforum model they have been carefully estimated.
When the North American Free Trade Agreement was being discussed there were more that 
twenty studies using models to determine its effects. All but two of them were CGEs and assumed full
employment. But the effects of the Agreement on employment and the dynamics of adjustment over 
time were the very heart of the debate! No wonder that the Inforum analysis which linked an Inforum 
model of the USA with a similar one for Mexico was the only one used by the administration in its 
presentations to Congress. 
For me, dynamics are essential. The model has to be able to show growth to be interesting, Down 
turns and crises should not be ruled out by the very structure of the model – though it may contain 
policy variables that can be used to mitigate them. Unemployment is a very real phenomenon, and a 
model that excludes it is of little interest. I wish I had a model that would produce the subprime boom 
of 2001-2007 and the crash of 2008, not one that pretends such things don't exist.   
The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) Byway
The exaggerated message of the Lucas critique was not unwelcome in the academic world. In 
fact, much of its influence was due, I believe, to how welcome it was. Building and constantly updating
empirically rich econometric models is a lot of work and is not easily published in academic journals. 
Academic economists who did not like having to build large, data-rich models and having to keep up 
with what was happening in the real world in order to have their views on economic policy respected 
were only too happy to be told that those models were no good for policy analysis anyway. 
It was said that the Lucas critique demanded models that had “deep” economic roots. What 
“deep” turned out to mean was that the models had to involve explicit maximization subject to 
constraints of some utility function. The utility function should be maximized by varying policies; any 
influence of the policies on the constraints had to be explicit. The Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) models7 were born. They all had a maximizer who had some objective function 
usually based on his consumption in various periods and a production function with links from one 
period to the next. Typically, saving in one period would create capital for the next, which would 
improve the production function in that later period. The maximizer, however, would be hit by 
random “shocks” which might benefit or hurt him. He could know the probability of various events, 
7 A good introduction to these models may be found in Dynamic Economics – Quantitative Methods and Application 
by Jerome Adda and Russell Cooper, (MIT Press, 2003). The applications there are mostly of the sort that I find 
quite valid. Sadly, the book is dedicated to Lance Armstrong, “notre maitre à tous” and the cover picture shows him
winning a race. 
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but he did not know until the future period how the event would actually turn out. Numerical methods 
could be used to find optimal policies for the maximizer. A main point was that no constant parameter
of the constraints should depend upon the actions of the maximizer. 
Such a model would seem to me to make a lot of sense in operations research or in the theory of 
the firm or of the individual consumer. But they were applied immediately to the whole economy in 
what were called Real Business Cycle models.8 It was found, apparently to the surprise of the model 
builders, that if the production function was an aggregate function for the whole economy, some 
imaginary maximizer was hypothesized, and the random events hit the aggregate production function, 
then “business cycles” appeared. Because the models had no financial sector, they were called “real” 
business cycles. The models were elaborated, run many times with randomly generated shocks, and 
their results subjected to analysis to describe the nature of the cycles. With proper adjustment of the 
parameters of the model, they could produce cycles similar on average with those of the real economy.
As mentioned, the origin of the cycles in the Real Business Cycle models is variations in what is 
rather strangely called “total factor productivity” or TFP. If the aggregate production function is 
written
 Q(t) = A (t) f ( K (t) , L(t)) ,
where Q, K, and L are output, capital, and labor respectively, then A (t ) is called total factor 
productivity – “factor independent productivity” would have been a better name. There are indeed, 
fluctuations in A (t )  The reason is that, in recessions, firms “hoard labor,” that is, they do not cut 
back employment as much as output has fallen. They expect to need the labor again as output 
recovers. If a laid-off worker finds a job elsewhere, the firm will have the expense of training a new 
employee. Thus, the observable fluctuations in A(t) are not, in fact, the primary cause of business 
cycles but a secondary effect of the fluctuations. This well-known fact seems never to have bothered 
the builders of Real Business Cycle models, who confidently put the cart before the horse. 
Fluctuations in TFP, which had been quite considerable in the USA during the 1960s and 1970s, 
lessened after about 1981, a development called the Great Moderation by the Real Business Cycle 
school and taken as the exogenous explanatory factor for the moderation of business cycles after that 
date. In fact, however, it was the change in Regulation Q of the Federal Reserve Board that moderated
the business cycle, which then moderated the fluctuations in TFP. In other words, the Real Business 
Cycle proponents got it exactly backwards. 
This school has, however, become so influential that I find today's graduate students actually 
believe it, despite the fact the two recessions they should be able to remember – the dot-com crisis of 
2000 and the subprime crisis and Great Recession of 2008 clearly had nothing whatever to with a 
productivity shock. In both cases, the root problem was that some financial assets had become greatly 
over-valued. In the second case, having to face the true value of the tranches of packages of subprime 
mortgages which it held led to the failure of the Wall Street firm of Lehman Brothers. That failure, in 
turn, set off a paralysis of the financial system that produced The Great Recession. This crash, like all 
I can think of, originated in the financial sector and spread to the real sector, not the other way around.
A further fundamental problem with the DSGE models is deciding who the maximizer is and 
specifying his objective function. This is no doubt the basis of Robert Solow's stinging criticism 
voiced at Congressional hearings on July 20, 2010 held to learn why macroeconomists failed to 
foresee the financial crisis of 2007- 2008.9 He said:
8 Kydland, F.E.; Prescott, E.C. (1982). "Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations". Econometrica 50 (6): 1345–1370
9 It is off the subject of this paper, but in case anyone would like my answer to this question, I'll give it briefly. The 
problem arose in the subprime mortgage market, that is, in mortgages that did not meet the traditional standards for 
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I do not think that the currently popular DSGE models pass the smell test. They take it for 
granted that the whole economy can be thought about as if it were a single, consistent person 
or dynasty carrying out a rationally designed, long-term plan, occasionally disturbed by 
unexpected shocks, but adapting to them in a rational, consistent way... The protagonists of 
this idea make a claim to respectability by asserting that it is founded on what we know about
microeconomic behavior, but I think that this claim is generally phony. The advocates no 
doubt believe what they say, but they seem to have stopped sniffing or to have lost their sense
of smell altogether.
These models are said to offer “insights” into how the economy worked. How a model which has 
so little relation to how the economy works could offer “insights” into its functioning totally escapes 
me. When the nation was in bad need of good economic advice during the 2008 crisis, I heard of none
coming from the DSGE or Real Business Cycle school, perhaps because it was so patently obvious 
that the crisis did not result from a productivity shock.
Nevertheless, some central banks are now maintaining DSGE models in addition to other tools. 
Perhaps they think of themselves as the maximizer. But in that case, the DSGE is little different from 
a traditional econometric model with policy-invariant parameters and capable of being run with 
random shocks and of optimizing a specified objective function with respect to various policies. 
Models built with the Inforum software have those capabilities. 
In short, I think the DSGE models may be a useful tool in operations research, but they add little 
if anything to our ability to model the whole economy or design good policy. They have, however, 
absorbed the attention of many bright young economists.
 Conclusion
Well-built Inforum and Inforum-type models are data-rich, realistic descriptions of economies 
that provide sufficient product detail to speak to business users as well as to government policy makers.
If thoughtfully constructed, they avoid the Lucas criticism. They are capable of being run in a 
business-cycle mode or, by proper choice of policies, in a balanced, steady growth mode. The work 
done on them has been motivated by a desire to make them better descriptions of the real economy, 
never just to use an ingenious mathematical device. They are more flexible and realistic than the 
CGEs, more detailed and reasonable than the DSBEs. But building and maintaining them is a lot of 
work of a kind that is not much rewarded in the academic world. Moreover, they do not guarantee that
dangerous developments – such as the subprime boom – will be detected and eliminated before it is 
too late. But then neither do any of the present alternatives. Somehow, to follow Solow's metaphor, 
economists need to develop better tools for sniffing out trouble. When they do, I hope the tools will be 
built into Inforum models.
investor-grade mortgages. The first problem was – and is – that there are no regularly released, free statistics on 
subprime mortgages. Statistics are compiled, copyrighted, and sold at hefty prices by the Mortgage Bankers 
Association. From time to time, the Association publishes articles which show the national totals, so the data are not
secret but neither are they readily and regularly accessible to academic economists The second problem was that no 
one suspected that firms with such financial acumen as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers would get themselves 
into such a situation. Even if one suspected trouble, there was no way to prove it from outside the firm. Indeed, it is 
now clear that only a handful of the top management at Lehman knew how serious the situation was. Thirdly, no 
one – especially not the President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank – realized how strongly Lehman was tied 
in with the rest of the financial system. When Lehman failed, no one wanted to lend to anybody for fear that the 
borrower might in some way be dependent on Lehman for its financial soundness. Thus panic, the greatest danger 
in the financial world, greatly magnified the effect of the Lehman failure. While it was easy enough to see, as I had 
done, that the stock market was – and had been for several years – at levels out of all proportion to corporate 
earnings, it was quite a different matter to pinpoint the time when the crash would come or to forecast its depth.
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